APPELLATE BODY OF THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION CRISIS: CONSEQUENCES AND PATHWAYS TO REFORM
Keywords:
Appellate Body, Developing Countries, Dispute Settlement, DSU Reform, Judicial Overreach, MPIA, Multilateral Trading System, Trade Governance, WTO, WTO ReformAbstract
The paralysis of the World Trade Organization's Appellate Body since December 2019 has precipitated the gravest institutional crisis in the history of the multilateral trading system. The inability of WTO Members to agree on new appointments has rendered the appellate mechanism non-functional, leaving the dispute settlement system without its supreme judicial layer and creating a legal vacuum that no interim arrangement has yet adequately filled. This article examines the structural, political, and legal dimensions of this crisis, tracing the origins of Member State dissatisfaction with the Appellate Body, particularly the sustained objections of the United States concerning judicial overreach, procedural delays, and the treatment of trade remedy disciplines. The article analyses the Multi-Party Interim Appeal Arbitration Arrangement and evaluates its adequacy as a substitute for the Appellate Body. It further examines the various reform proposals advanced by WTO Members and academic commentators, assessing their feasibility and implications for the future architecture of multilateral trade governance. Special attention is paid to the interests of developing country Members, who stand to lose most from the erosion of the rules-based trading system. The article argues that durable reform requires a negotiated political settlement among major trading powers that balances rule-of-law imperatives with legitimate concerns about judicial boundaries, and that any viable solution must ensure genuine access for all Members, including those with limited legal and institutional capacity.
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Copyright (c) 2026 Dr. Khurram Baig, Abida Mumtaz, Akhtar Ali Ansari , Ghulam Arbi (Author)
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